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DODD-FRANK, INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES, 
AND MOBILE BANKING: THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE’S ROLE IN ENABLING 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Colin C. Richard* 
International remittances—“cross-border person-to-person payments of 
relatively low value”1 sent primarily by international migrants to family 
members in developing countries2—alleviate poverty, support entrepreneur-
ship, and foster the development of financial systems.3  Until recently, aside 
from prohibitions on financial interactions with countries such as Cuba or 
Burma,4 U.S. regulators have only indirectly addressed these monetary 
transfers.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank) changes this, providing direct, substantive regulation of 
the industry for the first time.5  Dodd-Frank calls on the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (Board) to craft more than a dozen regula-
tions to enforce Dodd-Frank’s remittance provisions within eighteen 
months.6  These regulations can either stifle progress in the remittance in-
dustry or help it become more efficient. 
 
  *  Fulbright Fellow, Sierra Leone; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Political Science, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
1  COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE SERVICES 6 (2007) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAYMENTREMMITTANCE/Resources/New_Remittance_Repo
rt.pdf (link). 
2  See generally SANKET MOHAPATRA ET AL., WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES UNIT, 
OUTLOOK FOR REMITTANCE FLOWS 2011–12: RECOVERY AFTER THE CRISIS, BUT RISKS LIE AHEAD 
(2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief13.pdf (explaining recent trends in remittance flows to 
developing countries) (link). 
3  See infra Part I.B. 
4  See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Damien Cave, Obama to Loosen Restrictions on Policy with Cuba, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/world/americas/05cuba.html (link).   
5  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1073, 
124 Stat. 1376, 2060–67 (2010) (link). 
6  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(c), 919(d)(2)–(3)), 124 Stat. 2063–64.  For convenience, cita-
tions to proposed portions of the section 919 language―as provided in Dodd-Frank to amend the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006)—are cited to section 1073(a)(4) of Dodd-Frank as “§ 
1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919).” 
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This Article recommends regulations that would enable a thriving 
business environment for transfer providers and preserve reasonable con-
sumer protections.  Part I describes the international remittance industry, 
including its role in enabling economic development and in alleviating pov-
erty.  Part I then predicts the changes that the industry is likely to undergo 
in the near future.  Part II explains Dodd-Frank’s remittance provisions.  
Part III provides recommendations to the Board on how it can design regu-
lations that best enable global economic development. 
I. INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES 
A. The Remittance Industry Today 
In 2010, an estimated $440 billion in remittances were sent world-
wide,7 primarily by many of the 215.8 million international migrants.8  The 
global average fee for sending a remittance has recently dropped to 8.62%,9 
but a specific remittance’s actual price varies significantly depending on the 
country corridor,10 exchange rates, amount sent, and type of transfer pro-
vider used.  At the least expensive end of the spectrum, a $200 transfer 
from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan costs $3.24 on average, or 
1.62% of the transfer;11 on the upper end, a $200 transfer from Tanzania to 
Kenya costs $47.27 on average, or 23.64% of the transfer.12  Reducing the 
current global average by half would make an additional $14 billion avail-
able each year to remittance recipients in developing countries13—
approximately 41% of the total U.S. foreign aid budget in 2010 and ap-
 
  7  MOHAPATRA ET AL., supra note 2, at 14 tbl.1. 
8  INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES 
FACTBOOK 2011, at 18 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter FACTBOOK 2011], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf (link). 
9  PAYMENT SYS. DEV. GRP., WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE PRICES WORLDWIDE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
TRENDS IN THE AVERAGE TOTAL COST OF MIGRANT REMITTANCE SERVICES 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
REMITTANCE PRICES], available at 
http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/~/media/FPDKM/Remittances/Documents/RemittancePriceWorld
wide-Analysis-Dec2010.pdf (link). 
10  International remittance channels are financial pipelines between two distinct markets—the send-
ing and receiving countries.  Prices can vary significantly between these different channels for a variety 
of reasons, including the volume of remittances sent between two countries.  Therefore, in an analysis of 
transfer prices, the focus is often on individual corridors (e.g., United States to El Salvador) rather than 
on the overall price for all remittances originating in the United States or all remittances arriving in El 
Salvador.  See Remittance Prices Worldwide, WORLD BANK, 
http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/Country-Corridors (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) (link). 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  See MOHAPATRA ET AL., supra note 2, at 1; REMITTANCE PRICES, supra note 9 (reducing the 
global average fee to 4.31% would create savings for remittance senders sending money to developing 
countries equal to $14,007,500,000). 
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proximately 556% of the international development assistance portion of 
this budget.14 
A “remittance transfer provider” is the “person or financial institution 
that provides remittance transfers for a consumer in the normal course of its 
business.”15  Transfers can be of varying speed and complexity, but they all 
require “access points” where consumers can send and receive funds, and 
procedures linking those access points.16  There are four primary models for 
transfer services: (1) unilateral, (2) franchised, (3) negotiated, and (4) 
open.17  For “unilateral services,” a lone transfer provider offers “a proprie-
tary product provided ‘internally’” without “other entities [acting] as cap-
turing or disbursement agents.”18  With “franchised services,” the transfer 
provider, “without necessarily having any access points of its own, provides 
a proprietary service” and uses other entities to provide access points.19  
“Negotiated service” transfer providers—often larger commercial banks—
“negotiate[] with a limited number of other” entities to form a “network of 
access points.”20  “Open service” transfer providers offer “proprietary serv-
ice[s]” to senders, while the transfer is received through “an open network 
to which any [remittance service provider] can have direct or indirect ac-
cess.”21 
B. Remittances as a Tool for International Economic Development 
Remittances encourage and enable efficient international economic de-
velopment by providing an influx of capital to developing countries in an 
amount that is second only to foreign direct investment.22  In 2010, consum-
 
  14  See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 
SUMMARY TABLES, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 13 tbl.3a (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138174.pdf (listing the total U.S. 2010 foreign aid budget 
as $34,493,782,000 and the Development Assistance portion as $2,520,000,000) (link). 
15  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(g)(3)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2065 (2010). 
16  GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 2. 
17  Id. at 9–10 (explaining how these categories “differ primarily according to how a network of ac-
cess points is created and linked”). 
18  Id. at 9. 
19  Id.  Note that, “[t]he term ‘franchised’ is used for convenience. In practice, the legal form of the 
arrangement may not always be a franchise.”  Id. at 9 n.11. 
20  Id. at 10. 
21  Id. 
22  Compare MOHAPATRA ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (explaining that new data reveal that “officially 
recorded remittance flows to developing countries fell to $307 billion in 2009”), with Query Wizard for 
International Development Statistics, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=1&y=6&f=4:1,2:1,3:51,5:3,7:1&q=4:1+2:1+3:51+5:3+7:1+1:1+6:2009 
(providing that official development assistance to all developing countries in 2009 totaled $127.5 bil-
lion) (link), and Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Annual, 1970–2009, 
UNCTADSTAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (providing that 
foreign direct investment in developing economies in 2009 totaled approximately $478.35 billion) (link).  
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ers sent an estimated $325 billion of the estimated $440 billion remitted 
globally to developing countries.23  For at least twenty-one countries, inter-
national remittances represent 10% or more of gross domestic product 
(GDP).24  Remittances also have several benefits over other forms of capital 
flow.  Unlike the interest payments on bilateral and multilateral develop-
ment loans or the dividend payments on foreign direct investments, remit-
tance payments do not require a corresponding outflow of capital.25  
Additionally, remittances are received directly by the intended recipient, 
providing an efficiency advantage over foreign aid, which often encounters 
significant overhead before its benefits arrive at the intended constituen-
cies.26 
The indirect effects of international remittances for developing econo-
mies are as important as the direct benefits of international remittances for 
individual households.  Recipients may use remittances for saving and in-
vesting,27 but between 80% and 90% of remittances are used for essentials, 
including “food, clothing, shelter, health care and education.”28  Regardless 
of the purpose of the expenditure, the spending itself creates further bene-
fits.29  Throughout developing countries, remittances also reduce poverty,30 
                                                                                                                              
But see FACTBOOK 2011, supra note 8, at 17 (citing official development assistance to developing coun-
tries in 2009 as $120 billion, remittance transfers to developing countries in 2009 as $307 billion, and 
foreign direct investment in developing countries in 2009 as $359 billion). 
23  MOHAPATRA ET AL., supra note 2. 
24  Tajikistan (35.1%), Tonga (27.7%), Lesotho (24.8%), Moldova (23.1%), Nepal (22.9%), Leba-
non (22.4%), Samoa (22.3%), Honduras (19.3%), Guyana (17.3%), El Salvador (15.7%), Jordan 
(15.6%), Haiti (15.4%), Kyrgyz Republic (15.1%), Jamaica (13.8%), Bosnia & Herzegovina (12.7%), 
Serbia (12.6%), Bangladesh (11.8%), Philippines (11.3%), Albania (10.9%), Nicaragua (10.3%), and 
Togo (10.3%).  See FACTBOOK 2011, supra note 8 (providing six Country Group summaries that each 
list the 2009-top remittance recipients by percentage of GDP).  This total is potentially larger, as remit-
tance data is currently not available for twenty countries including Afghanistan, American Samoa, Bhu-
tan, Central African Republic, Chad, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kosovo, Marshall 
Islands, Mayotte, Micronesia, Montenegro, North Korea, Palau, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.  Id. 
25  See GIBRIL FAAL, REMITAID, MITIGATING THE STRUCTURAL IMPERFECTIONS AND NEGATIVE 
IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.remitaid.org/downloads/Mitigating%20the%20Imperfections%20of%20Remittances%20-
%20Gibril%20Faal%20-%20GKP.pdf (link). 
26  See id. 
27  Id. at 2; GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1. 
28  INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., REMITTANCES: SENDING MONEY HOME 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ifad.org/pub/factsheet/remittances/e.pdf (providing statistics from a 2006 study) (link).  In 
February 2011, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Deputy Secretary-General Petko 
Draganov emphasized that “[e]vidence shows that a significant amount of remittance transfers to devel-
oping countries is spent on household consumption and human capital.”  Attention Needed so that Bil-
lions in Migrants’ Remittances Do Most to Help Families, Boost Countries’ Economic and Social 
Development, Experts Say, UNCTAD PRESS (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=14542&intItemID=1528&lang=1 (link). 
29  See FAAL, supra note 25, at 3 (“[T]he mere act of expenditure means that people who work in the 
businesses that provide the wide range of services earn incomes, and in turn spend their earnings by buy-
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promote entrepreneurship,31 and develop financial infrastructure.32  The ex-
change of remittances through formal transfer channels promotes the finan-
cial sector because the inflow of income creates a gateway to the use of 
other financial services.33  Additionally, a 10% increase in remittances re-
duces poverty in the receiving country by 3.5%.34  This poverty-reduction 
benefit is even greater in rural areas.35  The poverty-reduction and the de-
velopment benefits of remittances keep global institutions pushing for effi-
ciency-minded remittance reforms.36 
C. The Remittance Industry Tomorrow  
In five to ten years, the remittance industry will change greatly because 
of increases in the variation of service providers and transfer business mod-
els,37 the expansion of mobile phone ownership,38 and the extension of mo-
                                                                                                                              
ing goods and services provided by other workers―thus a virtuous circle of income earning and expen-
diture is created in the local economy.”). 
30  See generally RICHARD H. ADAMS, JR., UNITED NATIONS, DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, 
MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CRITICAL NEXUS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P01_Adams.pdf (“Using data from na-
tionally-representative household surveys . . . this paper finds that international worker remittances sig-
nificantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world.”) (link); Richard H. 
Adams, Jr., Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3418, 2004) 
(link); Ernesto López-Córdova, Globalization, Migration and Development: The Role of Mexican Mi-
grant Remittances (INTAL-ITD, Working Paper No. 20, 2006) (link). 
31  WORLD BANK, INCREASING THE MACRO-IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON DEVELOPMENT 4 (2007), 
available at http://gfmd.org/en/gfmd-documents-library/brussels-gfmd-2007/doc_download/423-rt-23-
increasing-the-macro-impact-of-remittances-on-development-english.html (“Several studies also show 
that remittances provide capital to small entrepreneurs, reduce credit constraints and increase entrepre-
neurship.”) (link); Reena Aggarwal et al., Do Workers’ Remittances Promote Financial Development? 7 
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 3957, 2006) (“Remittances have also been shown to promote entre-
preneurship.”) (link); Dean Yang, International Migration, Human Capital, and Entrepreneurship: Evi-
dence from Phillipine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks 22–25 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3578, 
2005) (explaining that while “there is little evidence of a clear, strong relationship between the exchange 
rate shock and entrepreneurial activity overall . . . [,] it does appear that the exchange rate shocks are 
significantly associated [with] entry into new entrepreneurial activities.”) (link). 
32  See Aggarwal et al., supra note 31, at 4 (explaining that the authors’ “empirical analysis provides 
support for a robust positive impact of remittances on financial sector development”). 
33  See id. at 2–3. 
34  See Richard H. Adams, Jr. & John Page, Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce 
Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1645, 1660 (2005) (link). 
35  See Aggarwal et al., supra note 31, at 6. 
36  See, e.g., GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 4–5 (highlighting the “links between remittances 
. . . and poverty alleviation” as a key reason for the World Bank’s ongoing involvement in reducing bar-
riers to international remittances); G8 MINISTERS, RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE 49 (2009), available at 
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf (G8 Summit 2009 
in L’Aquila) (noting the “development impact” of international remittances in a call for nations to facili-
tate a “more efficient transfer and improved use of remittances”) (link). 
37  As mobile banking continues to grow, the role these platforms hold in increasing distribution ac-
cess points for remittance transfer providers is likely to increase.  See generally GSMA Mobile Money 
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bile signal availability.39  These changes will further fuel the beneficial role 
that remittances play in international economic development.  The mobile 
phone may provide the critical determinant for the direction in which the 
industry evolves.  The increasing ability to execute transfers through cyber 
communications and through mobile phones will reduce reliance on fixed-
location access points, a change that benefits both senders and recipients.40  
Mobile remittances can help reduce the transfer costs for senders and the 
opportunity costs for recipients.  For example, major technology companies 
are developing proprietary mobile payment platforms that operate across a 
multitude of banking and telecommunications networks, a “development 
that could shake up markets”41 by creating a cheaper, more efficient means 
for connecting access points. 
On the sending side, growth in mobile phone availability hints at 
changes on the horizon.  Major U.S. technology firms are taking steps in the 
direction of a “mobile wallet.”  Google’s newest version of its Android mo-
bile operating system enables near-field communication, a development that 
could allow mobile phones to replace the dominance of card-based payment 
                                                                                                                              
Deployment Tracking, MOBILE MONEY EXCHANGE, http://www.wirelessintelligence.com/mobile-money 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2010) [hereinafter GSMA Mobile Money Deployment Tracking] (documenting the 
current size of the mobile banking industry, which has grown from several platforms to several hundred 
platforms in the last few years) (link). 
38  Global mobile phone subscriptions have increased 13.5% in the last year to an estimated 5.28 bil-
lion.  In developing countries, mobile phone subscriptions have increased 18.6% in the last year and 
now account for 72.8% of the world’s total subscriptions.  Just five years ago, the number of mobile 
phone subscriptions in developing countries represented 54.4% of the world’s total subscriptions.  See 
Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service Sector, INT’L TELECOMM. 
UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom.html (last modified Oct. 21, 2010) 
(link). 
39  In July 2010, the number of worldwide mobile connections exceeded five billion.  Only eighteen 
months earlier, the number of worldwide mobile connections had reached the four billion mark.  Press 
Release, The GMSA, GSMA Announces that Global Mobile Connections Surpass 5 Billion (July 9, 
2010), http://www.gsmworld.com/newsroom/press-releases/2010/5265.htm (“[T]he mobile penetration 
rate on a global basis at the 5 billion connection mark was 74 percent, compared to 60 percent at 4 bil-
lion connections.  The highest penetrated region is Western Europe at 130 percent, while the lowest is 
Africa at 52 percent. Eastern Europe (123 percent) is the only other global region to have exceeded 100 
percent mobile penetration.”) (link); see also Ignacio Mas & Kabir Kumar, Banking on Mobiles: Why, 
How, for Whom?, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, June 2008, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.4400/FN48.pdf (link).  In the first quarter of 2008, the wireless 
penetration rates in Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, and the Middle East were 30.60%, 70.40%, and 
61.91% respectively.  Availability is predicted to grow in those regions to 50.13%, 90.84%, and 98.26% 
respectively by the first quarter of 2012.  Id. 
40  See MANUEL OROZCO ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, IS THERE A MATCH BETWEEN 
MIGRANTS, REMITTANCES AND TECHNOLOGY? 10–11 (2010), available at 
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/a%20match%20in%20migrants%20remittances%20and%2
0technology%20MO_FINAL_11.4.101.pdf (link). 
41  See Claudia McKay & Mark Pickens, Branchless Banking 2010: Who’s Served? At What Price? 
What’s Next?, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1, available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.47614/FN66_Rev1.pdf (link). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/7/ 254 
systems.42  AT&T Mobility, T-Mobile USA, and Verizon Wireless have re-
cently announced a new joint venture, Isis, to “build[] a mobile payment 
network that utilizes mobile phones to make point-of-sale purchases.”43  
These three mobile carriers represent almost two-thirds of the U.S. market.44  
Google’s and Isis’s actions may signal the beginning of the transition from 
a card-based payment economy to a mobile-based payment economy.45  As 
this progression continues, it is more likely that mobile-based systems will 
become the primary technology choice for sending remittances.  Smaller 
operations are also emerging to facilitate mobile transfer and payment op-
tions,46 while MoneyGram and Western Union both continue to expand 
their own mobile-based platforms.47  These developments offer conven-
iences and, in the long run, the possibility of cheaper services for interna-
tional remittance customers.48 
On the receiving side, the development of increased distribution points 
provides the most important component for reducing opportunity costs for 
the recipient.49  For decades, the dominant business model has relied on the 
 
  42  See Ryan Singel, Next Android Version Includes E-Wallet for Real World Purchases, WIRED 
EPICENTER (Nov. 15, 2010, 8:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/android-wallet (link). 
43  AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless Announce Joint Venture to Build National Mobile Com-
merce Network, ISIS, http://www.paywithisis.com/#/news/ (last visited Mar. 8. 2011). 
44  See Devindra Hardawar, Pay With Your Phone: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile Announce Isis Mobile 
Commerce Network, MOBILEBEAT (Nov. 16, 2010), http://venturebeat.com/2010/11/16/pay-with-your-
phone-att-verizon-t-mobile-announce-isis-mobile-commerce-network/ (link). 
45  One of the largest card-based providers is changing course toward mobile-payments as well.  See 
Elinor Mills, Mobile Phone E-Wallets Get Closer to Reality, CNET REVS. (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13970_7-20032840-78.html (quoting the global head of Visa Mobile, who 
predicted that “The move from leather wallets to mobile wallets will come this year.”) (link).  The com-
bined effect of these mobile developments suggests mobile-based systems are likely to rival or to re-
place card-based systems in the near future.  See id. 
46  See, e.g., About Obopay, OBOPAY, https://www.obopay.com/corporate/en_US/aboutUs.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (link); About Us, PAYNEARME, http://www.paynearme.com/about (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2011) (link); Mobile Money, SHAKA PAY, http://shakapay.com/index.php/services/mobile 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (link). 
47  Dan Butcher, Western Union Reveals International Mobile Strategy, MOBILE COMMERCE DAILY, 
(June 3, 2010), http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/2010/06/03/western-union-reveals-international-
mobile-strategy (link); Jordan Crook, MoneyGram Launches Global Mobile Money Transfer Service, 
MOBILE MARKETER (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.mobilemarketer.com/cms/news/banking-
payments/3830.html (link); Heather McLean, Western Union and Etisalat Introduce M-Money Transfer 
to 18 Countries, Posting to Mobile Money Exchange, GMSA (Feb. 17, 2011, 9:05 AM), 
http://www.mobilemoneyexchange.org/News/western-union-and-etisalat-introduce-m-money-transfer-
to-18-countries (link); Mobile Money Transfer Fact Sheet, WESTERN UNION, 
http://corporate.westernunion.com/news_media_MobileMoney.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (link); 
Courtney Muir, MoneyGram Rolls Out Mobile Money Transfers Throughout US, MOBILE COM. DAILY 
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/2010/04/22/moneygram-international-supports-
mobile-money-transfers-throughout-us (link). 
48  Mobile banking is 19% cheaper on average than traditional banking and 50% cheaper than infor-
mal money transfer options.  McKay & Pickens, supra note 41, at 2, 5 (asserting findings based on a 
2009 “analysis of the prices of 16 branchless banking services and 10 traditional banks”). 
49  An increased number of access points could also reduce transfer costs for the sender. 
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transfer provider securing fixed-location sending agents and distributing 
agents, thus forfeiting a significant percentage from the revenue stream to 
each.50  The introduction of access points that deliver the transfer directly to 
the recipient can decrease transfer costs by reducing overall operating costs, 
expanding available markets, and enabling the development of new pricing 
structures. 
Replacing fixed-location agents with an individual’s mobile phone as 
the primary distribution point resolves remittance transfer problems of both 
access and cost.  Businesses continue to capitalize on the fact that over 
“[eighty] percent of the world’s population is now within mobile cover-
age.”51  For example, Paypal allows users to send money from their mobile 
phones and has recently teamed up with Globe GCASH to allow GCASH 
users in the Philippines to receive international remittances directly on their 
mobile phones.52  Worldwide, 101 mobile banking platforms have already 
been deployed with another ninety-four planned deployments.53  These 
companies have tended to build customer bases around a domestic transfer 





  50  See George R. Kalan & Dilek Aykut, Reps., Orien Ventures & World Bank, Assessment of Re-
mittance Fee Pricing (July 2005), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/AssessmentofRemittanceFeePricing.pdf 
(Background paper for World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2006) (link). 
51  See Mark Pickens et al., Scenarios for Branchless Banking in 2020, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, Oct. 
2009, at 1, 2, available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.40599/FN57.pdf (link). 
52  Farhard Irani, Globe GCASH Uses PayPal to Transform Mobile Phones into Virtual Wallets, 
PAYPAL BLOG (May 28, 2010), https://www.thepaypalblog.com/2010/05/globe-gcash-uses-paypal-to-
transform-mobile-phones-into-virtual-wallets/ (link).  Globe GCASH is a mobile banking platform that 
enables “GCASH subscribers to conveniently send and check GCASH balance” through the Internet and 
through mobile phones.  GLOBE GCASH, https://www.gcashonline.net/g2mpgam78/ (last visited Feb. 
20, 2011). 
53  GSMA Mobile Money Deployment Tracking, supra note 37 (link).  The GSM Association is “the 
global trade association for the mobile communications industry” and it tracks the mobile banking plat-
forms that have already been deployed.  McKay & Pickens, supra note 41, at 1 & n.1. 
54  See, e.g., Olusegun Abolaji Ogundeji, Mobile Money Services Stay Hot in Sierra Leone, 
COMPUTERWORLD ZAM. (Apr. 27, 2010),  
http://www.computerworldzambia.com/articles/2010/04/27/mobile-money-services-stay-hot-sierra-
leone (exemplifying how one network-neutral platform, Sierra Leone’s SplashMoney, first expanded its 
customer base and subsequently planned to introduce an international remittance product) (link); Mi-
chael Ouma, M-Pesa Now Ventures Abroad to Tap into Diaspora Cash, E. AFRICAN (Oct. 19, 2009, 
12:00 AM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/-/2560/673512/-/5gaimnz/-/index.html (exempli-
fying how one telecom-based platform, Kenya’s M-Pesa, first expanded its customer base and subse-
quently introduced an international remittance product in 2009) (link). 
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D. Remittance Regulatory Structure  
Policymakers should aim to create a “sound, predictable, non-
discriminatory and proportionate” remittance regulatory system.55  Before 
Dodd-Frank, remittances were regulated by individual states’ financial in-
stitution regulations,56 measures to combat money laundering and terrorism 
financing,57 compliance with economic and trade sanctions,58 and foreign 
governments’ regulations and restrictions.59 
Dodd-Frank’s remittance provisions will have a significant effect on 
the development of the remittance industry.  The ideal system would be a 
more competitive remittance market with common-sense consumer protec-
tion, such that the sender is protected but business is not stifled.  The World 
Bank suggests that lower barriers to entry, transparent pricing, easy access 
to transfer services, and “reasonable” consumer protection would “reduce 
the price of remittance services” by creating a more competitive remittance 
market.60  The Board has the opportunity to advance the international remit-
tance industry toward these ideals. 
II. REMITTANCES UNDER DODD-FRANK 
Dodd-Frank was created “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices . . . .”61  With these aspirations, Dodd-Frank takes four actions in 
the remittance context.  First, it adds a “Remittance Transfers” section62 to 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA).63  This section requires remit-
tance transfer providers to make certain disclosures to consumers and to 
 
  55  GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 16. 
56  See, e.g., Money Transmission Act, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1800–03, 1805–06, 1810–22, 1825–28 
(2011) (link). 
57  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental “policy-making body” estab-
lished by the G-7 Summit in 1989.  The FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations provide international standards 
to advise national legislative bodies on how to combat “money laundering and terrorist financing.”  
About the FATF, THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) (link); 
see also Timothy R. Lyman et al., Regulating Transformational Branchless Banking: Mobile Phones 
and Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, Jan. 2008, at 9–10, available 
at http://ww.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2583/FN43.pdf (link). 
58  See, e.g., Schmitt & Cave, supra note 4. 
59  See, e.g., Lyman et al., supra note 57, at 1, 7–9 (explaining foreign governmental control of 
which entities can serve as financial distribution agents). 
60  GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
61  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1376 pmbl. (2010).  
62  Id. § 1073(a)(4) 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–65 (proposed § 919). 
63  15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (2006).  
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post certain notices.64  The section also establishes a transfer error procedure 
for the industry.65  Second, Dodd-Frank instructs the Board “to work with 
the Federal Reserve banks and the Department of the Treasury to expand 
the use of the automated clearinghouse system and other payment mecha-
nisms” for international remittances.66  Third, Dodd-Frank requires relevant 
federal agencies to “provide guidelines to financial institutions . . . regard-
ing the offering of low-cost remittance transfers . . . .”67  Fourth, Dodd-
Frank requires that the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Pro-
tection report to the President and relevant committees of the Senate and 
House of Representatives on the feasibility of using remittance transfer his-
tories in developing credit scores.68 
Dodd-Frank’s real effects on the international remittance industry go-
ing forward remain unclear.  There are nine areas where Dodd-Frank re-
quires the Board to create a rule or standard or to comply with a reporting 
responsibility.69  Additionally, there are five areas in the legislation that 
permit the Board to act if it sees fit.70  The regulations must be introduced 
within eighteen months of the effective date of the legislation, by January 
21, 201271—although the remittance-transfer portion of the regulations are 
expected to be “among the first changes in consumer finance to emerge 
from” Dodd-Frank,72 possibly arriving as early as mid-spring 2011.73 
 
  64  See infra Part II.A. 
65  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 
919(d)(1)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–67. 
66  Id. § 1073(b)(1). 
67  Id. § 1073(c)(1). 
68  Id. § 1073(e). 
69  See id. §§ 1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(a)(6)(A)(iii) (requiring prescription of Internet notice 
rules), 919(a)(6)(B) (requiring studies and analyses to determine the effectiveness of notice require-
ments), 919(d)(1)(B)(iii) (requiring determination of other appropriate remedies for remittance transfer 
errors), 919(d)(2) (requiring development of error resolution standards), 919(d)(3) (requiring creation of 
cancellation and refund rules), 919(f)(2) (requiring prescription of standards for agent liability)), 
1073(b)(1) (requiring expansion of the use of the automated clearing house for remittance transfers), 
1073(b)(2) (requiring reports on the status of the automated clearing house), 1073(e) (requiring reports 
on the use of remittance transfers for credit scores). 
70  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(a)(4)(B) (permitting extension of disclosure exceptions for 
banks and credit unions), 919(a)(5) (permitting any of four exemptions to the disclosure requirements), 
919(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii) (permitting creation of model transfer notice requirements), 919(a)(6)(A)(iv) (per-
mitting creation of standards or requirements regarding notice requirements), 919(c) (permitting pre-
scription of rules regarding transfers to nations where the amount of currency to be received may be 
unknown)). 
71  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(c), 919(d)(2)–(3)). 
72  Carter Dougherty, Western Union, MoneyGram May Lose as Fed Sets Remittance Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-11/western-union-
moneygram-may-lose-as-fed-warren-target-remittance-fees.html (link). 
73  CUNA, WOCCU Meet with Fed on Dodd-Frank Burdens, CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N (Oct. 20, 
2010), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/10/wash101910-2.html (link). 
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Within the EFTA section 919 amendment, there are two key mecha-
nisms governing remittance provider operations: required disclosures and 
posted notices.  Additionally, Congress has provided several more regula-
tory methods. 
A. Required Disclosures  
Dodd-Frank requires remittance transfer providers to make three writ-
ten disclosures “in a form that the sender may keep.”74  First, upon request-
ing a transfer but before any payment for services is made, the sender must 
be given a statement that describes the amount to be distributed to the re-
cipient, the associated fees, and the exchange rate “to the nearest 1/100th of 
a point.”75  Then, upon payment, the sender must be given two additional 
disclosures.  First, the provider must produce a receipt detailing the infor-
mation disclosed in the prior statement, the promised date of delivery, and 
the name and contact information (if provided) for the recipient.76  Second, 
the provider must produce a statement that includes the sender’s rights and 
the required contact information for the remittance transfer provider, for the 
relevant state regulator, and for the Board.77 
If the remittance transfer is conducted through an asset account held in 
an insured bank or credit union and the transfer provider is unable to know 
the amount of currency to be received by the recipient, then the disclosure 
will be considered accurate under Dodd-Frank if it “provide[s] a reasonably 
accurate estimate.”78  This safe harbor provision is set to expire on July 22, 
2015.  However, Congress has permitted the Board to extend the exception 
up to an additional five years if the Board finds that not extending the pro-
vision would “negatively affect the ability” of banks or credit unions to 
send international remittances.79  For all other transfer providers, the Board 
is permitted to create a similar “reasonably accurate estimate” exception in 
cases where the laws or transfer methods of the recipient country make it 
difficult for the transfer provider to know the amount of currency to be re-
ceived.80  Overly precise exchange rates and delivery dates can restrict the 
transfer provider’s ability to transact through agents and would be a signifi-
cant obstacle for some models of mobile remittances. 
 
  74  § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(1)–(2)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–65.  These disclosures must “be 
made in English and in each of the foreign languages principally used” by the provider or agent with re-
gard to that transfer product.  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(b)). 
75  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(2)(A)). 
76  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
77  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(2)(B)(ii)). 
78  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(4)(A)).  An “insured depository institution” is defined by 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2006).  Id.  An “insured credit union” is defined by 
Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1752 (2006).  Id. 
79  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(4)(B)). 
80  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(c)). 
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Notably, Congress has provided the Board significant room for inter-
preting the strength and applicability of these disclosure requirements.  In 
addition to the “reasonably accurate estimate” exception, Congress has al-
lowed for the Board to create three exemptions to the disclosure require-
ments.81  The Board can choose to enact any or all of the following: if the 
transaction is conducted by telephone, then the transfer provider can satisfy 
the initial disclosure over the telephone and the receipt and error resolution 
statement by mail;82 all required disclosures can be executed in one docu-
ment;83 and, if conducted electronically, the transfer provider can satisfy the 
initial disclosure by displaying the required information “electronically in a 
manner that the sender can keep.”84  Enabling disclosure in various forms of 
media can encourage the application of technology to transfer operations, a 
step likely to support the growth of mobile remittances.  Moreover, allow-
ing for the consolidation of disclosure information can help increase the 
usefulness of these disclosures for the sender.  These steps increase the like-
lihood that the legislation’s intent will be realized in the regulations’ ef-
fects. 
B. Posted Notices 
The legislation requires the Board to develop website notice require-
ments for transfer providers that offer Internet-initiated remittance trans-
fers.85  Additionally, Congress has given the Board the option to create 
storefront notice requirements for transfer providers.86  These potential rules 
can include requiring transfer providers to “prominently post, and timely 
update, a notice describing a model remittance transfer”87 and to display 
such notice in “every physical storefront location owned or controlled” by 
the provider.88  The Board also has the authority to create additional store-
front or Internet notice “standards or requirements.”89  Prior to creating ei-
ther storefront or Internet notice requirements, the Board must “undertake 
appropriate studies and analyses” to determine whether these requirements 
will assist the consumer in price-shopping remittance services or in “under-
stand[ing]” the fee structure of the services.90 
 
 
  81  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(5)). 
82  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(5)(A)–(B)). 
83  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(5)(C)). 
84  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(5)(D)). 
85  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(A)(iii)). 
86  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii), 919(a)(6)(A)(iv)). 
87  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(A)(i)). 
88  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(A)(ii)). 
89  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(A)(iv)). 
90  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(B)). 
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C. Additional Responsibilities  
Congress also established industry-wide procedures for transfer er-
rors.91  Furthermore, Congress instructed the Board to create “appropriate 
standards or conditions” for agent liability,92 to “expand the use of the 
automated clearinghouse system” for international remittances,93 and to re-
port to both the President and Congress regarding the feasibility of using 
remittance histories in calculating credit scores.94  
III. FEDERAL RESERVE’S REGULATIONS 
In preparing to draft the regulations, the Board has held public meet-
ings with various remittance industry lobbying constituencies,95 many of 
whom are uncertain about the ramifications of Dodd-Frank’s remittance 
provisions.  The largest transfer providers believe the goals of Congress 
may be “well-intentioned,” but that regulators have been afforded “a lot of 
latitude” and may end up creating “unintended consequences,” such as re-
duced competition and increased costs for the consumer.96  The regulations 
“may require technological upgrades”97 and, some believe, the regulations 
“are likely to drive up the cost of most” U.S.-originated remittance trans-
fers.98  The smaller firms view the new rules as “an unnecessary burden” on 
the industry.99 
To the contrary, this legislation fulfills an unmet need and has the po-
tential to balance the interests of the consumer with the ability of the trans-
fer providers to operate in a free manner.  But, in electing to directly 
regulate the industry, Congress and the Board should follow a course that is 
most likely to ensure long-term industry growth, continued or greater mar-
ket competition, and reduced prices for remittance senders. 
The Board’s regulations should strive to lower consumer costs by in-
creasing competition and access to accurate real-time information, enabling 
the growth and use of emerging technology, and promoting the common-
 
  91  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(d)(1)–(3)). 
92  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(f)(2)). 
93  Id. § 1073(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2065. 
94  Id. § 1073(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 2066–67. 
95  See Communications with the Public: Consumer Financial Protection, BD. GOVERNORS FED. 
RESERVE SYS., available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_consumer.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2011) (link). 
96  Dougherty, supra note 72 (quoting representatives from both MoneyGram and Western Union). 
97  Id. 
98  E.g., Global Regulatory Update – September 2010, WORLD COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNIONS, 
http://www.woccu.org/bestpractices/legreg/regupdate9 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (citing the Credit Un-
ion National Association) (link). 
99  Dougherty, supra note 72 (citing the executive director of the National Money Transmitters As-
sociations). 
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sense notion that the “benefits of regulation . . . outweigh the costs.”100  In 
this way, the U.S. regulatory system can help meet the international goal of 
reducing the global average service fee for remittance transfers, “generating 
a significant net increase in income for migrants and their families in the 
developing world.”101  To advance these goals and to enable the develop-
ment of mobile banking, the remainder of Part III provides five recommen-
dations that the Board should consider. 
A. Section 919(a)(4)(B) & 919(c)—Disclosure Exceptions 
The Board is permitted to extend the disclosure exceptions for certain 
institutions for an additional five years and to create a disclosure exception 
for transfers to some countries.102  Absent an exception, the legislation re-
quires the transfer provider to disclose the exchange rate “to the nearest 
1/100th of a point”103 and the promised date of delivery.104  Because these 
precisions could constrain some transfer models and could limit the devel-
opment of remittance transfers supported by mobile banking,105 the issue fo-
cuses on whether the Board will allow for the continued use of floating 
rates and estimated dates.  The Board should allow for estimated exchange 
rates and delivery dates in the instances where exceptions are permitted. 
Some consumer advocates contend that “all institutions should comply 
with [the] full disclosure requirements in all instances” and should only be 
allowed to deviate “in the clearest instances of exchange-rate uncer-
tainty.”106  Yet, cheaper transfers and greater choice between transfer pro-
viders and transfer models create a more impactful benefit for consumers 
 
  100  Rosemary Gallagher et al., Reps., Western Union, Remittance Disclosure Requirements Under 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 19 (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/western_union_meeting_20101103.pdf (Presentation at 
meeting between Federal Reserve Staff and representatives of Western Union) (link). 
101  G8 MINISTERS, supra note 36, ¶ 134. 
102  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(a)(4)(B), 919(c)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–65 (2010).  Note that the Board 
may not extend the disclosure exceptions for more than ten years.  Id. 
103  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 
104  Id. § 1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)). 
105  See Dan O’Malley et al., Reps., MoneyGram, Dodd-Frank Remittance Transfer Provisions Dis-
cussion 16 (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/MoneyGram_meeting20101013.pdf [hereinafter Mon-
eyGram mtg.] (Materials from the meeting between Federal Reserve Staff and representatives of Mon-
eyGram) (“Innovations such as mobile transfers . . . will be stifled due to the challenges with fixing rates 
in a multi-network transfer[.]”) (link); id. at 18 (“Innovation may be stifled as new transfer methods and 
the integration of networks can not easily comply with fixed rates (e.g. [sic] international [automated 
clearing house] networks) . . . . ”). 
106  Annette LoVoi et al., Reps., Appleseed, Proposed Rulemaking under the Dodd-Frank Act, Sec-
tion 1073, Remittance Transfers (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/appleseed_meeting_20101027.pdf [hereinafter Apple-
seed mtg.] (Paper and materials from the meeting between Federal Reserve Staff and representatives of 
Appleseed) (link). 
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than the slight protections offered by over-precise rates and dates.  Allow-
ing transfer providers to use floating rates alleviates some costs because, in 
certain channels, “currency risk does not get priced into the transaction” and 
consumers can “time their receive in an attempt to get a better rate.”107  
Moreover, non-closed loop transfer providers will be disadvantaged if the 
Board requires a precise delivery date because these providers “must rely 
on third-parties [sic] that control the ultimate distribution of the funds.”108  
Any steps to limit the ability of transfer providers to rely on third-party dis-
tribution agents would be critically detrimental to the development of mo-
bile remittance transfers at this stage.109 
B. Section 919(a)(5)—Disclosure Exemptions 
Congress has permitted the Board to adopt four exemptions that ease 
the ability of transfer providers to comply with the disclosure require-
ments.110  The Board should allow for phone disclosure of the initial price 
quote111 and for the transfer provider to issue a text-message or email dis-
closure immediately upon conclusion of the transaction.  This, as opposed 
to the suggestion of mailing a receipt within one business day, is more 
likely to match the transaction with the disclosed information, and thus 
more effectively achieves the purpose of the proposed section 919 disclo-
sure requirements.112 
 
  107  MoneyGram mtg., supra note 105, at 16. 
108  Danny Alaya & Daniel Lainsbury, Reps., Wells Fargo, Dodd-Frank Act Section 1073 Remit-
tances 14 (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/wells_fargo_meeting_20101014.pdf [hereinafter Wells 
Fargo mtg.] (Materials from the meeting between Federal Reserve Staff and representatives of Wells 
Fargo) (link). 
109  Mobile remittances will, at least initially, predominantly involve transfer providers joining with 
mobile banking platforms in markets around the world.  These mobile companies team with a vast array 
of retail enterprises throughout their countries to enable customers to “cash out” the transfers.  See 
DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISERS, CGAP TECH. PROGRAM, IMPROVING ACCESS AND REDUCING 
COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES THROUGH BRANCHLESS BANKING SOLUTIONS 11–12, 17 
(2010), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.49049/Dalberg-
CGAP_Intl_Remit_Branchless_Banking_Findings.pdf (providing examples of known deployments that 
involve partnerships between transfer providers and global banking platforms) (link).  By restricting the 
ability of transfer providers to viably rely on agents at either of these stages, the range of possible busi-
ness models will be severely constrained and variables for reducing the current average service fees will 
be removed.  See id. at 14 (identifying common challenges in market entry). 
110  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(5)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2061–63 (2010). 
111  Appleseed raises the concern that allowing oral disclosures for phone orders may corrupt the ef-
fectiveness of the requirement because “there is no guarantee that on each occasion that oral disclosures 
are used, they are provided exactly as prescribed.”  Appleseed mtg., supra note 106.  This problem is 
negated if the Board allows for consolidated disclosures via text or email, simultaneously or immedi-
ately following the phone transaction. 
112  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 
919(a)(2)(A)–(B)), 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–65. 
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Additionally, the Board should allow the transfer provider to consoli-
date the three disclosures into one electronic or print receipt that clearly 
identifies the enumerated pieces of information.  This consolidation is 
cheaper to comply with for the business and is more likely to be effective at 
conveying the intended information to the consumer.  Multiple print or 
electronic disclosures increase the opportunity for confusion, as well as the 
odds that the consumer will disregard one or all of the statements, thus ne-
gating the purpose of the requirement in the first place. 
These suggested regulations will effectively streamline the disclosure 
requirements for businesses and consumers, and will thus preserve the ef-
fects intended by Dodd-Frank.  Further, by allowing for disclosure in vari-
ous forms of media, the Board can enable transfer providers to diversify and 
to expand their operations through the use of technology.  This possibility 
will, in turn, increase the likelihood of success for mobile-initiated transfer 
services and decrease costs for consumers. 
C. Section 919(a)(6)(B)—Study the Effectiveness of Notice Requirements 
Dodd-Frank requires the Board to prescribe rules regarding Internet 
notices and permits it to prescribe rules regarding storefront notices.113  The 
Board is required to conduct “appropriate studies and analyses,” prior to 
implementing rules regarding Internet or storefront notices, to determine 
whether such rules would actually improve the customer’s ability to com-
pare prices and to understand the associated costs.114  The results of four in-
quiries will allow the Board to determine if notice requirements actually 
benefit the consumer, or if they simply impose unnecessary costs on busi-
nesses. 
To adequately address many of the concerns raised by the businesses 
that have met with the Board and to comply with the legislation’s direc-
tives, the Board should determine the comparative benefits for the con-
sumer and the costs for the business for each of the following: (1) posting 
model transactions versus posting real-time price and foreign exchange 
rates;115 (2) posting information for all transfer corridors offered at that loca-
tion versus posting the most-used corridors for that location;116 (3) requiring 
 
  113  Id. §1073(a)(4) (proposed §§ 919(a)(6)(i)–(iv)). 
114  Id. §1073(a)(4) (proposed § 919(a)(6)(B)). 
115  See Appleseed mtg., supra note 106; Wells Fargo mtg., supra note 108, at 9; Letter from Manuel 
Orozco, Dir., Remittances and Dev. Program of Inter-American Dialogue, to Daniel Akaka, U.S. Sena-
tor (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/Inter-
American_meeting20101013.pdf [hereinafter Orozco Letter] (link). 
116  For global transfer providers, any given location can potentially transfer money to 190 countries, 
but the vast majority of the customers at a given location will not be concerned with data for most of the 
options.  To require each location to post information for all country corridors offered imposes signifi-
cant costs, including development of new technology, without providing equal benefit for that specific 
location’s customers.  See MoneyGram mtg., supra note 105, at 12 (commenting that current technology 
is unavailable “to effectively dynamically post rates for 190 countries”). 
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storefront notices versus making the information available through either an 
interactive terminal, a toll-free phone number, a website,117 or a mobile ap-
plication; and (iv) whether notice requirements would likely “inhibit” the 
offering of certain products or services.118 
D. Section 919(a)(6)(A)—Internet and Storefront Notice Requirements 
Requiring providers to physically post model transfers and fluctuating 
exchange rates throughout the day would institutionalize an inefficiency 
that achieves less protection for consumers than cheaper alternative options.  
As the director of Inter-American Dialogue points out, the effectiveness of 
posting model transfers raises “accuracy and disclosure problems,” and the 
“physical posting” of prices and exchange rates is “most likely not” the so-
lution to the consumer information gap.119  Moreover, Wells Fargo believes 
storefront notice requirements may keep providers from offering beneficial 
products such as pricing based on account relationships or amount trans-
ferred.120  MoneyGram contends that requiring a storefront notice would 
create a “significant competitive disadvantage” for MoneyGram and West-
ern Union, “the only two global companies,” because it would require real-
time postings for up to 190 countries, while “single corridor providers” 
would only be responsible for one country.121 
These criticisms support the conclusion that the most effective solution 
to enable efficient comparison shopping is to offer personalized, real-time 
price quotes.  This solution would eliminate the need for pre-transaction 
dialogue with a transfer provider employee.  Wells Fargo has suggested that 
the Board allow businesses to comply with notice requirements by provid-
ing computer terminals, toll-free phone numbers, or Internet websites to 
check real-time price and foreign exchange rate information for a given 
transaction.122  What these solutions are getting at is the consumer’s need 
for a twenty-first century solution, not an antiquated rule requiring the 
physical posting and updating of constantly fluctuating rates.  To choose the 
latter would lock the industry into an inefficient and costly system, instead 
of looking forward to cheaper and more manageable solutions that simulta-
neously benefit both the business and the consumer. 
The legislation divides remittance services between Internet-initiated 
and store-initiated transfers.  Instead, the division should be between trans-
fers requiring employee interaction, like store-based transfers, and those 
that do not.  This distinction plays a bigger role in the consumer’s ability to 
comparison shop transfer services.  Where the pricing information is ob-
 
  117  See Wells Fargo mtg., supra note 108, at 10. 
118  Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
119  Orozco Letter, supra note 115, at 1, 7. 
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121  MoneyGram mtg., supra note 105, at 12. 
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tained (storefront, in-store kiosk, mobile phone, or Internet) is irrelevant, so 
long as the same accurate information can be easily gathered from any of 
the sources without requiring the consumer to engage an employee of that 
provider. 
Thus, the Board should not require transfer providers to post model 
transfer data.  Instead, the Board should impose the storefront notice that 
has been called too costly and irrelevant, and make it applicable to all remit-
tance transfers—both store-based and remote.  But, it should allow transfer 
providers to comply by offering at least three of the following means for the 
consumer to gain personalized real-time pricing information: a store-based 
terminal, a toll-free phone number, a text-message system, a mobile appli-
cation, or a Website.  If the development and offering of these pro-
consumer products is actually cheaper than the storefront notice as the 
companies suggest,123 then the companies will pursue these options.  This 
will result in the companies spending less than they would have under the 
storefront notice approach, and the consumer will have gained a wide spec-
trum of options for seeking real-time, personalized pricing information. 
E. Section 919(f)(2)—Agent Liability Standards  
Finally, the Board must develop “appropriate standards or conditions” 
for holding remittance transfer providers liable if their agents do not comply 
with Dodd-Frank’s remittance provisions.124  Yet, relevant state law and the 
“general tenets of principal-agent liability . . . apply regardless of . . . the 
specific liability provisions of Section 919.”125  Remittance transfer provid-
ers could be unfairly burdened without any commensurate increase in con-
sumer protection if agent liability is defined too broadly.  More importantly, 
setting too harsh of an agent liability standard will serve as a deterrent for 
transfer providers that would have otherwise experimented with different 
means for increasing sending and receiving access points to their networks, 
such as through mobile banking platforms.  The Board should adopt a will-
ful negligence standard for holding transfer providers liable for their agents’ 
compliance failures.126  The potential for reduced service fees arising from 
transfer providers exploring creative approaches to increase access points 





  123  See, e.g., id. at 9 (“Storefront disclosures . . . effectively mandate electronic boards that can be 
automatically updated throughout the day.”). 
124  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
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CONCLUSION 
International remittances are essential to economic development 
around the world.  A reduction in the global average remittance transfer fee 
can have a beneficial effect multiple times that of foreign development aid, 
and the growth of mobile banking is and will be an important key for reduc-
ing the cost.  Remittances spur poverty reduction, entrepreneurship, and fi-
nancial sector advancement in developing countries.  In crafting the new 
Dodd-Frank regulations, the Board should take steps to enable mobile re-
mittance transfers. 
First, the Board should permit estimated exchange rates and dates of 
delivery in its disclosure exceptions.  Second, the Board should permit 
phone and electronic disclosures, and allow for consolidation of the re-
quired disclosures.  Third, the Board should thoroughly study the effective-
ness of offering interactive price checks in meeting the goals of a storefront 
notice requirement.  Fourth, the Board should pursue a notice requirement 
that facilitates consumer access to accurate personalized pricing data with-
out the need to interact with an employee.  Finally, the Board should adopt 
a willful negligence standard of agent liability. 
Together, these five actions will encourage the development of mobile 
remittance transfers and are the most likely regulatory means for continuing 
the downward trend in remittance prices—an event that will help to allevi-
ate global poverty. 
